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Abstract
We extend a recently developed DEA methodology for cost efficiency anal-
ysis towards profit efficiency settings. This establishes a novel DEA toolkit
for profit efficiency assessments in situations with multiple inputs and multiple
outputs. A distinguishing feature of our methodology is that it assumes output-
specific production technologies. In addition, the methodology accounts for the
use of joint inputs, and explicitly includes information on the allocation of in-
puts to individual outputs. We also establish a dual relationship between our
multi-output profit inefficiency measure and a technical inefficiency measure
that takes the form of a multi-output directional distance function. Finally,
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we demonstrate the empirical usefulness of our methodology by an empirical
application to a large service company.
Keywords: DEA, multiple outputs, nonparametric efficiency analysis; profit
efficiency, joint inputs, output-specific inputs, directional distance function.
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1 Introduction
Production processes that generate multiple outputs are typically characterized by
jointly used inputs, i.e. inputs that simultaneously benefit different outputs. These
joint inputs give rise to economies of scope, which actually form a prime economic
motivation for Decision Making Units (DMUs) to produce more than one output. In
the current paper, we establish a methodology for multi-output profit efficiency eval-
uation that explicitly accounts for jointly used inputs. In particular, our methodology
distinguishes between joint inputs and inputs that are allocated to specific outputs.
DEA analysis of multi-output production. The method that we develop fits
within the popular Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA; after Charnes, Cooper and
Rhodes (1978)) approach to productive efficiency measurement. This DEA approach
is intrinsically nonparametric, which means that it does not require a paramet-
ric/functional specification of the (typically unknown) production technology. It “lets
the data speak for themselves” by solely using technological information that is di-
rectly revealed by the observed production units. It then reconstructs the production
possibility sets by (only) assuming standard production axioms (such as monotonicity
and convexity).1 A DMU’s efficiency is measured as the distance of the correspond-
ing input-output combination to the efficient frontier of this empirical production set.
Typically, a DMU’s efficiency can be computed by simple linear programming. Its
nonparametric nature and its easy computation largely explain DEA’s widespread
use as an analytical research instrument and decision-support tool.
1See Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), Cooper, Seiford and Zhu (2004), Cooper, Seiford and
Tone (2007), Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (2008) and Cook and Seiford (2009) for extensive reviews of
DEA. From an economic perspective, DEA itself is rooted in the structural approach to modeling
efficient production behavior that was initiated by Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972),
Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984). Given the explicit economic motivation of our
following analysis, our contribution also fits in this tradition of structural efficiency analysis.
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Recently, Cherchye et al (2013, 2014a) introduced a novel DEA methodology to
analyze cost efficiency in multi-output settings. The methodology assumes output-
specific production technologies, accounts for joint inputs in the production process,
and incorporates specific information on how inputs are allocated to individual out-
puts. As such they provide a formal modeling of the economies of scope that char-
acterize the multi-output production process.2 These authors have also shown that
their cost efficiency measure evaluated at shadow prices is dually equivalent to a spe-
cific multi-output version of the Debreu (1951) - Farrell (1957) measure of (radial)
input efficiency. This is an attractive feature, as DEA practitioners often use this
Debreu-Farrell measure for evaluating the technical efficiency of a DMU’s input use
(when assuming a fixed output).
At this point, we remark that the methodology of Cherchye et al (2013, 2014a)
is closely related to several existing approaches in the DEA literature. Firstly, there
is a clear connection with network DEA (see Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2000b) and Fa¨re,
Grosskopf and Whittaker (2007)). The literature on network DEA also makes use
of what we define further as output-specific inputs. However, to the best of our
knowledge, it abstracts from the possibility of jointly used inputs. These joint inputs
play an important role in our approach because they define the interdependencies
between the production processes associated with different outputs and, as a result,
they characterize the economies of scope that underlie the observed production pro-
cesses. Secondly, Salerian and Chan (2005) and Despic et al. (2007) present two
alternative methods to model inputs that contribute to some outputs but not to oth-
ers. As such, these models can actually be interpreted as special cases of our model
with joint inputs, but without having output-specific inputs.
2See also Tone and Sahoo (2003) and Sahoo and Tone (2013) for related work on modeling
economies of scope in a DEA context.
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Summarizing, these alternative approaches have in common that they try to en-
hance the realism of the efficiency evaluation exercise by integrating information on
the internal production structure. In a sense, we provide a unifying framework that
integrates these existing approaches. This framework should be particularly attrac-
tive to empirical researchers who are familiar with standard DEA techniques and
interested in the analysis of multi-output production characterized by joint inputs.
Profit efficiency analysis. The current paper extends this methodology for multi-
output efficiency assessments to profit efficiency settings, which makes our paper fit
in the extensive literature that studies profit efficiency and its extensions in a DEA
context.3 In many practical settings, profit efficiency is considered to be the best
suited criterion for evaluating the performance of productive activities. In addition,
by its very definition cost efficiency is a necessary condition for profit efficiency. Profit
efficiency evaluations are generally more stringent than cost efficiency evaluations.
As a result, they can signal additional sources of inefficiency and, thus, potential
performance improvements. In this respect, as we will indicate, an appealing feature
of our multi-output approach is that it also allows us to allocate a DMU’s aggregate
profit inefficiency to individual outputs. This helps to better identify specific output
production processes where substantial profit efficiency gains are possible, which can
usefully assist DMU managers to direct their performance improvement actions in an
effective way (i.e. primarily towards outputs that are characterized by considerable
inefficiency).
In developing our profit efficiency methodology, we also start from output-specific
technologies and distinguish between joint inputs and output-specific inputs in the
3See, for example, Cherchye and Van Puyenbroeck (2007), Juo, Fu and Yu (2012), Ruiz and
Sirvent (2012), Leleu (2013), Sahoo, Mehdiloozad and Tone (2014), and Boussemart, Crainich and
Leleu (2015) for recent contributions.
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process of multi-output production. Next, we will show that our profit inefficiency
measure under shadow prices has a dual representation as a directional distance func-
tion. We believe this is an interesting property, as directional distance functions have
become increasingly popular as a technical inefficiency measure that simultaneously
includes outputs produced and inputs used. Basically, this duality result extends the
one of Chambers, Chung and Fa¨re (1998) towards our specific multi-output setting. A
particular feature of our analysis here is that we explicitly account for output-specific
technologies with jointly used inputs in establishing the duality relationship.
Outline, The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some
necessary notation and terminology. Section 3 introduces our method for multi-output
profit inefficiency measurement. Section 4 establishes the dual representation of our
profit inefficiency measure as a directional distance function. Section 5 shows the
practical usefulness of our method through an application to a large service company.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
The distinction between inputs and outputs becomes less relevant in profit efficiency
analysis. Therefore, to simplify notation it will often be convenient to work with
“netputs” in our following exposition. As we will explain, netput vectors simul-
taneously capture inputs used (as negative components) and outputs produced (as
positive components). We will define this netput concept for our specific setting
with joint and output-specific inputs. In turn, this will allow us to introduce our
notion of output-specific technologies and, correspondingly, our particular concept of
multi-output profit.
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Netputs and multi-output technologies. We consider a production technol-
ogy that uses N inputs to produce M outputs, which we represent by the vectors
X = (x1, . . . , xN)′ ∈ RN+ and Y = (y1, . . . , yM)′ ∈ RM+ , respectively. Our method
distinguishes between joint and output-specific inputs.
• Output-specific inputs are allocated to individual outputs m, i.e. they specifi-
cally benefit the production process of (only) the m-th output. In our formal
analysis, we will use αmk ∈ [0, 1] (with
∑M
m=1 α
m
k = 1) to represent the fraction
of the k-th output-specific input quantity that is allocated to output m.
• Joint inputs are not allocated to specific outputs but are simultaneously used in
the production process of all the outputs. Clearly, these joint inputs generate
interdependencies between the production processes of different outputs.4
In the following we will assume that the allocation parameters αmk are observed.
We believe that in many instances this is not a strong assumption, since large firms
nowadays often use cost systems that explicitly allocate inputs/costs to outputs (e.g.
Activity Based Costing (ABC)) to support various strategic and operational decisions.
These cost systems can be used to define the αmk (see, for example, our own empirical
application in Section 5). Nevertheless, if this information is not available to the
empirical analyst, we can make use of alternative approaches that are not based on
observing this information, but try to reconstruct the decomposition (over outputs)
of the output-specific inputs in DEA analysis itself.5 Cherchye et al (2013) provide
a discussion on how to integrate these techniques in the approach to multi-output
4See Cherchye, De Rock and Walheer (2015) for the introduction of sub-joint inputs. These
inputs play a similar role as joint inputs, but only for a subset of (instead of all) outputs. It is
straightforward to include this third type of inputs in our methodology, but for the ease of the
exposition we abstract from this in the current paper.
5See, for example, Cook, Habadou, and Teunter (2000), Cook and Hababou (2001), Beasley
(2003), Li, Yang, Liang, and Hua (2009), Yu, Chern, and Hsiao (2013) and Du, Cook, Liang, and
Zhu (2014).
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efficiency analysis that we present here. These authors’ discussion focused on a cost
efficiency setting, but it readily extends to the profit efficiency setting that we consider
in the current paper.
We will represent the allocation of inputs to outputs by means of a vector Am ∈
RN+ for each output m, for which the entries are defined as (with αmk ∈ [0, 1] and∑M
m=1 α
m
k = 1)
(Am)k =

1 if input k is joint and used to produce output m,
αmk if input k is output-specific and used to produce output m,
0 if input k is not used to produce output m.
Then, each vector Am defines the input vector Xm = Am X, which thus contains
the input quantities used in the production process of output m.6
As indicated above, we can often simplify our notation by working with net-
puts, which simultaneously stand for outputs and inputs. Specifically, we use Z = Y
−X
 ∈ RM+N to denote the aggregate netput vector. In a similar vein, Zm =
 ym
−Xm
 ∈ R1+N+ represents the netput vector that is specific to output m.
Our multi-output analysis will involve a specific representation of each output
m’s production technology. This technology defines the output-specific production
possibility set
Tm = {Zm ∈ R1+N | Zm is technically feasible},
which contains all the combinations of output-specific and joint inputs (in Xm) that
can produce the output quantity ym.
6The symbol  stands for the Hadamard (or element-by-element) product.
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Prices and profits. To define profit, we use Px = (p
1
x, . . . , p
N
x )
′ ∈ RN+ for input
prices and Py = (p
1
y, . . . , p
M
y ) ∈ RM+ for output prices. Correspondingly, the netput
price vector is given as P =
 Py
Px
 ∈ RM+N+ .
To incorporate our distinction between output-specific and joint inputs, we make
use of output-specific input prices Pmx ∈ RN+ . First, for output-specific inputs, these
prices coincide with the actual prices, i.e.
(Pmx )k = (Px)k for k an output-specific input.
Next, following Cherchye et al (2013, 2014a) we make use of output-specific prices
(Pmx )k for every joint input k. Essentially, these prices (P
m
x )k capture the fractions of
the aggregate input price (Px)k that are allocated to individual outputs m. Efficient
production requires the output-specific prices (Pmx )k to add up to the aggregate DMU-
level prices, i.e. they must satisfy
M∑
m=1
(Pmx )k = (Px)k for k a joint input.
As explained in detail by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008), these output-
specific prices have a similar interpretation as Lindahl prices for public goods. Specif-
ically, Pareto efficient provision of public goods equally requires these Lindahl prices
to sum up to the aggregate prices.
Taken together, the output-specific price vector Pm for each output m is given as
Pm =
 pmy
Pmx
 .
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Correspondingly, for every output m we can define the output-specific profit
pim = Pm
′
Zm.
In turn, by summing these output-specific profit, we obtain the aggregate profit7
pi =
M∑
m=1
pim =
M∑
m=1
Pm
′
Zm = P′Z.
The last equality also shows that summing the profit levels associated with indi-
vidual netputs Zm yields, by construction, the DMU’s profit level defined in terms of
the aggregate netput Z. Given this, we will work with the sum profit
∑M
m=1 P
m′Zm
in what follows, without explicitly considering P′Z.
3 Multi-output profit efficiency
In practice, the true production technology is typically unknown. Therefore, in em-
pirical efficiency evaluations, we need to reconstruct the production possibilities from
a set of T observed DMUs. In what follows, we assume a setting in which we ob-
serve, for each DMU t, the netput vectors Z1t , . . . ,Z
M
t , which contain the joint and
output-specific inputs, as well as the resulting outputs.
In the current section, we will additionally assume that the empirical analyst
also observes the associated netput price vector Pt =
 Py,t
Px,t
 ∈ RM+N+ . At this
point, two remarks are in order. First, the assumption of observed prices is often
restrictive in empirical settings. In the next section, we will show how we can relax this
assumption by using shadow prices. Second, throughout we will assume that we do
7To obtain the last equality we use that∑M
m=1P
m′Zm =
∑M
m=1(p
m
y y
m)−∑Mm=1 (Pm′x Xm) = P′yY −P′xX = P′Z.
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not have any information about the output-specific prices for the joint inputs, which
typically holds true in practical applications (including our own application in Section
5). However, it is worth to indicate that, if extra information on output-specific prices
were available, it would actually be fairly easy to integrate this information in our
profit efficiency analysis.
Taken together, we assume that we observe a data set
S = {(Z1t , . . . ,ZMt ,Pt) | t = 1, . . . , T}.
Empirical efficiency criterion. Following a nonparametric approach, we recon-
struct the production possibilities while avoiding (non verifiable) parametric assump-
tions regarding the DMUs’ technologies. In our profit efficiency analysis, we (only)
use the following minimalistic prior regarding the production possibility sets.
Axiom T1 (observability means feasibility): Observing the netputs Z1t , . . . ,Z
M
t
implies for all m = 1, . . . ,M that Zm ∈ Tm.
This axiom has a very natural interpretation. Basically, it says that what we
observe is certainly feasible. Or, if we observe the netput vector Zmt =
 ymt
−Xmt
,
then we conclude that the input Xmt can effectively produce the output y
m
t .
8
Adopting our above notation of the previous section, we let Pmt =
 pmy,t
Pmx,t
 rep-
resent the m-th output-specific prices for DMU t, with the subvector Pmx,t containing
the prices for the output-specific and joint inputs as characterized in Section 2. Then,
building on Axiom T1, we obtain our empirical condition for profit efficient produc-
8Essentially, this axiom excludes measurement errors. Importantly, however, it is fairly easy to
extend our methodology to account for measurement problems. For compactness, we will not discuss
this question here, but refer to Cherchye et al (2013) for a detailed treatment.
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tion behavior.
Definition 1 (Profit efficiency): Let S = {(Z1t , . . . ,ZMt ,Pt) | t = 1, . . . , T} be a
data set. Then, DMU t is profit efficient if there exist, for all outputs m, output-
specific price vectors Pmt =
 pmy,t
Pmx,t
 ∈ R1+N+ , such that
(i) (Pmx,t)k = (Px,t)k for output-specific inputs k,
(ii)
∑M
m=1(P
m
x,t)k = (Px,t)k for joint inputs k,
(iii) Pm
′
t Z
m
t ≥ Pm′t Zms for all observations s = 1, . . . , T .
In words, this definition states that DMU t is profit efficient if, for the input and
output prices that apply to t (captured by Pmt for every output m), there does not
exist another observed DMU s (with netput vector Zms ) that attains a larger profit.
As such, given our multi-output setting, we have a separate profit efficiency criterion
for each different output m.
While we do observe the aggregate prices Pt, we typically do not observe the
output-specific prices Pmt because of jointly used inputs (i.e., for a joint input k, we
do not observe the price fraction (Pmx,t)k that is borne by m). Therefore, the criterion
in Definition 1 (only) requires that there exists at least one possible specification
of these prices that makes the observed behavior of DMU t consistent with profit
efficiency. As soon as such a specification exists, we conclude that profit efficient
behavior cannot be rejected given the information that is available (contained in the
data set S).
Measuring profit efficiency. In practice, if a DMU t does not meet the profit
efficiency criterion in Definition 1, we quantify the degree of profit inefficiency as the
12
extent to which actual profit deviates from maximum profit. In what follows, we will
introduce a method to measure profit inefficiency in our multi-output framework. In
doing so, we will adapt the “directional” profit efficiency framework of Chambers,
Chung and Fa¨re (1998) to our particular setting.
As a first step, we define, for each output m, the profit function
pimt (P
m
t ) = max
s∈{1,...,T}
(
Pm
′
t Z
m
s
)
,
which gives the maximum attainable profit over the observed set S for the prices Pmt
that apply to DMU t. Correspondingly, when summing over all outputs m, we obtain
the aggregate profit function
pit(P
1
t , ...,P
M
t ) =
M∑
m=1
pimt (P
m
t ).
In the sequel, we will focus on the profit inefficiency measure9
PECt (P
1
t , ...,P
M
t ) =
∑M
m=1 pi
m
t (P
m
t )−
∑M
m=1
(
Pm
′
t Z
m
t
)∑M
m=1 P
m′
t gZm
,
which we see as a natural translation of Chambers et al’s “directional” profit inef-
ficiency measure to our specific multi-output setting. In this definition, each gZm
represents the directional distance vector for the output m.10 Equivalently, we can
also express it as gZm =
 gym
gXm
, with gym ∈ R and gXm ∈ RN defining the output
and input directions, respectively. In practice, these directional vectors are chosen by
9We assume that the denominator (
∑M
m=1P
m′
t gZm) is positive. For the shadow profit ineffi-
ciency measure P̂E
C
t that we introduce below, this is guaranteed by the normalization constraint∑M
m=1 P̂
m′
t gZm = 1.
10In DEA applications, the directional vectors are often DMU-specific, i.e. we have gZm = gZmt .
It is common in the literature to drop the subscript t for compactness.
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the empirical analyst prior to the actual efficiency evaluation (see our own application
in Section 5 for example specifications of gZm). Clearly, PE
C
t (P
1
t , ...,P
M
t ) = 0 reveals
profit efficiency, while higher values PECt indicate a greater degree of profit inefficient
behavior.
In general, the value of the measure PECt (P
1
t , ...,P
M
t ) will depend on the output-
specific input prices that are used to evaluate the joint inputs (and contained in
(P1t , ...,P
M
t )). As indicated above, these prices are typically not known by the em-
pirical analyst. In what follows, we will choose prices that minimize the value of the
profit inefficiency measure PECt for DMU t under evaluation, i.e. we solve
PECt = min
P1t ,...,P
M
t ∈R1+N+
PECt (P
1
t , ...,P
M
t ),
where each output-specific price vector Pmt is subject to the conditions outlined in
Definition 1. Intuitively, by minimizing the profit inefficiency, we actually choose
“most favorable” prices Pmt for DMU t under evaluation. In other words, we evaluate
DMU t in the best possible light, which gives this DMU the benefit of the doubt
in the absence of true price information. Attractively, this falls in line with usual
DEA efficiency analysis, which typically can be given a similar benefit-of-the-doubt
interpretation.11
We conclude that DMU t meets our empirical profit efficiency criterion in Defini-
tion 1 if and only if PECt = 0. In that case, there effectively does exist a specification
of the prices Pmt that makes the observed production behavior profit maximizing over
the data set S. By contrast, profit inefficiency occurs if PECt > 0, with higher values
revealing a greater degree of profit inefficiency.
As a final remark, we note that the measure PECt can be computed by means
11See, for example, Cherchye et al (2007) for a detailed discussion of the benefit-of-the-doubt
interpretation of common DEA models.
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of linear programming. The associated program has a structure that is formally
analogous to the one of (LP-1) that we present below.12 Given this direct similarity,
and for the sake of compactness, we do not report it here.
4 Shadow prices and duality
In the previous section, we have assumed that the empirical analyst knows the netput
price vector Pt for every DMU t. In practical applications, however, reliable price
information is often not available. In such a case, we can conduct efficiency analysis
with endogenously defined shadow prices. In what follows, we will apply this shadow
pricing idea to the multi-output profit efficiency framework set out above. Next, we
will show that the resulting profit inefficiency measure (under shadow prices) has
a dually equivalent representation as a multi-output directional distance function,
which establishes a multi-output version of the original duality result in Chambers,
Chung and Fa¨re (1998).
Shadow prices. If we do not observe the true prices that apply to each DMU t,
the relevant data set becomes
Ŝ = {(Z1t , . . . ,ZMt ) | t = 1, . . . , T}.
When only Ŝ (instead of S) is given, we are forced to use a weakened version of
the efficiency criterion in Definition 1. Specifically, we can (only) check whether there
exists at least one feasible “shadow” price specification that supports profit efficiency
12The only difference between the linear program for PECt and the program (LP-1) for P̂E
C
t
involves the inclusion of the price information contained in the data set S (whereas (LP-1) applies
to shadow pricing). This price information is easily included in the form of linear constraints, which
obviously does not interfere with the linear programming nature of (LP-1).
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of the evaluated DMU t.
Definition 2 (Shadow profit efficiency): Let Ŝ = {(Z1t , . . . ,ZMt ) | t = 1, . . . , T}
be a data set. Then, DMU t is shadow profit efficient if there exist, for each output
m, non-zero output-specific shadow price vectors P̂mt =
 p̂my,t
P̂mx,t
 ∈ R1+N+ such that
P̂m
′
t Z
m
t ≥ P̂m′t Zms for all observations s = 1, . . . , T .
In this case, we can choose the shadow price vector P̂mt freely (except from the
non-zero and non-negativity constraints). Implicitly, the shadow prices (P̂
m
x,t)k for
the joint inputs k define the (aggregate) DMU prices (P̂x,t)k =
∑M
m=1(P̂x,t)k. Next,
we note that shadow prices for the output-specific inputs can be different for different
outputs, i.e. for output-specific inputs k we can have (P̂mx,t)k 6= (P̂m′x,t)k whenm 6= m′.13
Following our reasoning of the previous section, we can evaluate our shadow
profit efficiency criterion by the following efficiency measure, which endogenizes the
(shadow) price selection in the efficiency evaluation process:
P̂E
C
t = min
P̂1t ,...,P̂
M
t ∈R1+N+
∑M
m=1 pi
m
t (P̂
m
t )−
∑M
m=1
(
P̂m
′
t Z
m
t
)
∑M
m=1 P̂
m′
t gZm
.
Similar to before, P̂E
C
t selects the most favorable netput price vectors P̂
m
t to
evaluate DMU t’s shadow profit efficiency, which effectively applies the benefit-the-
doubt pricing in the absence of full price information. It is easy to verify that DMU t
satisfies the shadow profit efficiency criterion in Definition 2 if and only if P̂E
C
t = 0,
which reveals that there exists at least one possible specification of the shadow price
vectors P̂mt under which DMU t is profit maximizing over the data set Ŝ.
13In principle, of course, one can impose the constraint that (P̂mx,t)k = (P̂
m′
x,t)k for some output-
specific input k (and m 6= m′), which obtains a stronger efficiency criterion. We refer to Cherchye,
De Rock and Hennebel (2014b) for an exploration of such a stronger criterion in a multi-output cost
efficiency setting that is formally close to the profit efficiency setting that we consider here.
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To operationalize the measure P̂E
C
t , we need to normalize the denominator. In
what follows, we will use
M∑
m=1
P̂m
′
t gZm = 1.
Then, we can formulate our (shadow) profit inefficiency measure P̂E
C
t as solving
the linear program (LP-1)
P̂E
C
t = min
pi1t ,...,pi
M
t ∈R,
P̂1t ,...,P̂
M
t ∈R1+N+
M∑
m=1
pimt −
M∑
m=1
(
P̂m
′
t Z
m
t
)
s.t.
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} : pimt ≥ P̂m
′
t Z
m
s for all s ∈ {1, . . . , T},
M∑
m=1
P̂m
′
t gZm = 1,
where each pimt represents pi
m
t (P̂
m
t ), i.e. the maximum attainable profit (over the data
set Ŝ) in the production of output m given the output-specific prices P̂mt that apply
to the evaluated DMU t.
As a final note, apart from the “aggregate” profit inefficiency measure P̂E
C
t , we
can also define profit inefficiency measures P̂E
C,m
t that are specific to individual
outputs m. In particular, let pim∗t and P̂
m∗
t solve the above linear problem. Then, we
can use
P̂E
C,m
t =
pim∗t − P̂m∗′t Zmt
P̂m∗′t gZm
Clearly, for P̂E
C
t = 0 we will have P̂E
C,m
t = 0 for all m. However, if P̂E
C
t > 0, the
measures P̂E
C,m
t allow us to allocate DMU t’s profit inefficiency to specific outputs.
We will illustrate this feature in our empirical application in Section 5.
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Dual representation. Interestingly, our shadow profit inefficiency measure has a
dual representation as a multi-output version of the directional distance function in-
troduced by Chambers, Chung and Fa¨re (1998). We believe this is an appealing
property as directional distance functions are frequently used in DEA technical effi-
ciency evaluations that simultaneously account for inputs used and outputs produced.
This directional distance function representation appears from the dual version
of our linear program (LP-1). Specifically, let λms represent the dual variables for
the first constraint (for each output m and DMU s) and β the dual variable for the
second constraint of that program. Then, the dual can be written as (LP-2)
P̂E
C
t = max
λ1s,...,λ
M
s ,β∈R+
β
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} :
T∑
s=1
λms Z
m
s ≥ Zmt + βgZm ,
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} :
T∑
s=1
λms = 1.
To interpret P̂E
C
t as a multi-output version of the directional function, we first
note that in the case of a single output m, Chambers et al’s original version of the
general directional distance function is defined as
~D(Zmt ; gZm) = max {β| (Zmt + βgZm) ∈ Tm} .
As a natural extension towards our framework with output-specific technologies,
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we can define the multi-output version of this distance function as
~D(Z1t , . . . ,Z
M
t ; gZ1 , . . . ,gZM ) = max {β|∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} : (Zmt + βgZm) ∈ Tm} .
Then, it is easy to see that we obtain
P̂E
C
t = ~D(Z
1
t , . . . ,Z
M
t ; gZ1 , . . . ,gZM ),
if we define the production possibility set of output m as
Tm = {Zm | Zm ≤
T∑
s=1
λms Z
m
s ,
T∑
s=1
λms = 1, λ
m
s ≥ 0},
i.e. the convex monotone hull of the observed netput vectors Zms . Actually, this
convex monotone hull of observed netput vectors is often used as an (empirical) pro-
duction possibility set in practical DEA analysis. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984)
first proposed this technology specification in the DEA literature.14 A distinguishing
feature of our framework is that it uses this specification to construct a production
possibility set for each different output m. This follows naturally from our particu-
lar set-up, which explicitly considers output-specific production technologies (while
accounting for interdependencies through joint inputs).
14Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) show that we obtain the convex monotone hull as a DEA-
type technology approximation if we add the technology assumptions convexity and monotonicity
to our Axiom 1. In words, monotonicity implies that the outputs and inputs are freely (or strongly)
disposable; i.e. producing less outputs cannot lead to use more inputs and using more inputs never
reduces the outputs. It also implies that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between
inputs, outputs, and inputs and outputs) are nowhere negative or, in other words, there is no
congestion. Next, convexity says that convex combinations of feasible netput vectors are themselves
also technically feasible. This implies that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between
inputs, output and inputs and outputs) are nowhere increasing. The fact that the dual representation
of our shadow profit inefficiency measure implies a production set that is convex and monotone
follows from the result that these technology properties are essentially “irrelevant” for profit efficiency
analysis (i.e. imposing the properties will not interfere with the profit efficiency results). See, for
example, Varian (1984) for a detailed discussion of this last point.
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Summarizing, we conclude that our shadow profit inefficiency measure can also
be represented as a multi-output technical inefficiency measure. In particular, it can
be characterized as a multi-output directional distance function defined for output-
specific technologies that are convex and monotone. A specific feature of this char-
acterization is that it accounts for joint input use in the process of multi-output
production.
Example. To illustrate the directional distance function representation of our shadow
profit inefficiency measure, we make use of a fictitious example with three DMUs A,
B and C that produce two outputs y1 and y2 by using one input x. The fact that we
consider only a single input makes it possible to graphically represent the efficiency
analysis. We assume that input x is output-specific and we denote the allocation to
output 1 by α1x and to output 2 by α2x.15 Table 1 presents the relevant output and
input numbers.
y1 y2 x α1x α2x
DMU A 3 5 5 2 3
DMU B 5 1 5 4 1
DMU C 4 2 13 8 5
Table 1: Data and input allocation for the three DMUs
As explained above, our shadow profit inefficiency measure can be represented as
a multi-output directional distance function defined with respect to output-specific
production sets that are constructed as convex monotone hulls of the netput vectors
given in Table 1. These possibility sets are given in Figure 1, which also represents
the three DMUs under evaluation. For both outputs, the production frontiers are
fully defined by DMUs A and B. For output 1, DMU B is efficient because there are
15To facilitate our discussion, we here consider a situation with a single, output-specific input.
However, analogous examples with joint inputs are easy to construct.
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no other DMUs producing more output, and DMU A is efficient because it uses less
input than the other two DMUs. A similar reasoning holds for output 2. In this case,
DMU A produces the most output and DMU B uses the least input.
Figure 1: Production process - 2 outputs/1 allocated input
DMU C is clearly not on any frontier, which implies that it is inefficient. As
explained above, measuring the degree of inefficiency requires the specification of a
direction vector. For the current example, we consider the same three specifications
of direction vectors as in our following empirical application, i.e. gZm = (0,X
m),
gZm = (y
m, 0) and gZm = (y
m,Xm). We denote the associated efficiency measures as
P̂E
C,I
, P̂E
C,O
and P̂E
C,E
. As we will explain in more detail in Section 5, these effi-
ciency measures correspond to quantifying profit inefficiency in terms proportional in-
put reduction (for gZm = (0,X
m)), proportional output expansion (for gZm = (y
m, 0))
and simultaneous input reduction and output expansion (for gZm = (y
m,Xm)), re-
spectively.
The efficiency results for the three measures are presented in Table 2. Let us
consider in more detail the results for the measure P̂E
C,I
, which quantifies the degree
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of inefficiency in terms of proportional input reduction. DMUs A and B both have an
inefficiency score equal to zero, since they are situated on the production frontiers for
both outputs. To calculate the inefficiency score of DMU C, we first need to consider
both outputs individually. From the left panel of Figure 1 we learn that, for output 1, a
convex combination of DMUs A and B (with λ1A = λ
1
B = 1/2) defines a potential input
reduction of 62.5% (from 8 to 3 input units). Similarly, from the right panel of Figure
1, we find that a convex combination of DMUs A and B (with λ2A = 0.25 and λ
2
B =
0.75) reveals a potential input reduction of 70% (from 5 to 1.5 input units). Using
our above definition, the multi-output distance function equals min{62.5%, 70%} =
62.5%, which corresponds to the maximum equiproportionate input reduction when
simultaneously accounting for the production possibility constraints that apply to the
two individual outputs.16
P̂E
C,E
P̂E
C,I
P̂E
C,O
DMU A 0 0 0
DMU B 0 0 0
DMU C 0.250 0.625 0.250
Table 2: Efficiency scores for the three DMUs
A directly analogous interpretation holds for the other two directions of measure-
ment, i.e. P̂E
C,O
(output expansion) and P̂E
C,E
(simultaneous input and output
improvement). For compactness, we will not discuss this in detail. One notable ob-
servation from Table 2 is that the particular choice of direction vector impacts the
16As an additional note, we can verify that, for the same data set, the DEA model of Banker,
Charnes and Cooper (1984) obtains a maximum input reduction for DMU C equal to 61.5% (from 13
to 5 units of the aggregate input x), which is below the reduction of 62.5% that we identify through
our methodology. Just like our DEA model, the original model of Banker, Charnes and Cooper
also uses a convex monotone hull representation of the production technology. However, a basic
difference is that it does not consider output-specific production possibility sets. This illustrates
that our use of output-specific possibility sets enhances the “dicriminatory power” (i.e. potential to
detect inefficient production behavior) of the DEA evaluation. See also Cherchye et al. (2014a) for
a similar argument in a cost efficiency setting.
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efficiency results. This will also hold for our empirical application in Section 5.
5 Empirical application
We illustrate the empirical usefulness of our (shadow) profit efficiency method by
an application to the input and output data that were also analyzed by Cherchye
et al (2013) in their original study. These authors focused on multi-output cost
efficiency. As such, we complement this first study by assessing the profit efficiency
of the same DMUs. In the following, we will first discuss the specificities of our data.
Subsequently, we present the findings of our empirical analysis. After showing our
results for the DMUs’ aggregate profit inefficiency, we also consider output-specific
profit inefficiencies.
The data. Our data set contains input and output information for 290 offices
(DMUs) of a large European service company. Each DMU uses 7 inputs, i.e. three
types of labor (x1, x2 and x3), three types of transport (x4, x5 and x6) and other over-
head cost (x7), for the production of 7 outputs. Thus, we have N = 7 and M = 7.
All 7 inputs are expenditures, so prices times quantities. In a sense, this effectively
accounts for input quality differences across DMUs. Specifically, higher quality inputs
typically have higher prices, which in turn lead to higher expenditure levels (for given
quantities). See, for example, Camanho and Dyson (2005, 2008), Fukuyama and We-
ber (2008) and Sahoo, Mehdiloozad and Tone (2014) on the relevance of taking input
quality into account in DEA assessments.
The service company uses an “activity-based costing system”, which allows us
to allocate the first 6 inputs to the 7 individual outputs. That is, adopting the
terminology of Section 2, the three types of labor and transport are output-specific.
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The other overhead cost is modeled as a joint input, which simultaneously benefits
the production of all 7 outputs. We refer to Cherchye et al (2013) for more detailed
information on the input and output data that we use.17
Because we have no data on input and output prices, we conduct a shadow profit
efficiency analysis by using the methodology that we presented in Section 4. That
is, we evaluate each DMU’s profit efficiency by using “most favorable” input and
output prices. In particular, we consider two exercises. Our first exercise does not
impose any restriction on the possible prices (except from non-negativity). Obviously,
this computes profit efficiency of DMUs in the best possible light. However, since
no guidance is given in the shadow price selection process, it may well use shadow
prices that are very far from the prices really faced by the offices under evaluation.
Therefore, our second exercise makes use of price restrictions that better guarantee
“realistic” shadow prices. These restrictions have been defined in consultation with
the management of the service company, and were also used by Cherchye et al (2013)
in their original study.
Multi-output profit efficiency. To compute the shadow profit inefficiency mea-
sure P̂E
C
, we first need to specify the directional vector gZm for each output m. To
demonstrate the versatility of our approach, we will consider three different direc-
tional vectors. These three directional vectors are the most popular ones in applied
DEA analysis and, as we will explain below, imply alternative interpretations of the
observed degree of profit inefficiency.18 The first two directional vectors are:
17Cherchye et al (2013) also explain that confidentiality and strict non-disclosure agreements
prohibit us from providing more details on the nature and operations of the service company under
study.
18Our three directional vectors are DMU specific, which implies that we cannot aggregate the
efficiency scores to a regional or firm level; see Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2005) for more discussion. This
is in line with the objective of the management of the service company under study, who wanted to
benchmark the individual DMUs. As should be clear from our discussion above, alternative choices,
such as a common directional vector for all DMUs, are also feasible.
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• gZm = (ym,0) for each output m, which measures profit inefficiency in terms of
proportional output increase, and
• gZm = (0,Xm) for each output m, which measures profit inefficiency in terms
of proportional input reduction.
An attractive feature of these directional vectors is that they imply shadow profit
inefficiency measures that have a dual representation in terms of the input and output
oriented Debreu (1951) - Farrell (1957) technical efficiency measures, respectively.19
The third specification of the directional vector is:
• gZm = (ym,Xm) for each output m, which measures profit inefficiency in terms
of equiproportional output increase and input reduction.
We opt for using this additional specification because it simultaneously considers
output and input improvements in the DMUs’ efficiency assessment. Basically, in its
dual form, the resulting profit inefficiency measure combines the Debreu-Farrell input
and output efficiency measures in a single metric.
Table 3 summarizes the results of our first profit efficiency analysis, in which
we do not impose any restrictions on the possible shadow prices (except from non-
negativity). P̂E
C,E
refers to profit inefficiency with equiproportionate output increase
and input reduction, P̂E
C,I
to profit inefficiency with input reduction only, and P̂E
C,O
to profit inefficiency with output increase only. We provide summary statistics on the
19In particular, gZm = (y
m,0) obtains (a multi-output version of) the Debreu-Farrell output mea-
sure (DFO) minus one as the outcome of our program (LP-2), i.e. P̂E
C
= DFO−1 (where DFO ≥ 1
and DFO = 1 indicates efficiency). Similarly, gZm = (0,X
m) obtains one minus (a multi-output
version of) the Debreu-Farrell input measure (DFI) as the outcome of (LP-2), i.e. P̂E
C
= 1−DFI
(where DFI ≤ 1 and DFI = 1 indicates efficiency). See, for example, Chambers, Chung and Fa¨re
(1998) and Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2000) for a detailed discussion on the relations between directional
distance functions and Debreu-Farrell efficiency measures (including dual representations). Using
our results in Section 4, we can extend these authors’ arguments to our particular multi-output
setting.
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distribution of the inefficiency measures, as well as information on the number of
efficient DMUs (in absolute and relative terms).20
P̂E
C,E
P̂E
C,I
P̂E
C,O
Min 0 0 0
Mean 0.159 0.277 0.370
Median 0.149 0.286 0.311
Max 0.647 1 1
St. dev. 0.132 0.198 0.326
#Efficient 33 27 33
%Efficient 11.38 9.31 11.38
Table 3: Multi-output profit efficiencies without price restrictions
Interestingly, we observe quite some variation in profit inefficiency across the
DMUs in our sample, for all three directional vectors under consideration. For the
measure P̂E
C,E
the mean profit inefficiency amounts to 15.9%. On average, the of-
fices should equiproportionally reduce inputs and expand outputs by 15.9% to attain
shadow profit efficiency. Next, for the measure P̂E
C,I
, we find a mean inefficiency of
27.7%. Thus, if output is kept fixed, we need an average input reduction of 27.7% to
achieve efficiency. Finally, the mean value of P̂E
C,O
equals 31.1%, which signals that
profit efficiency requires an average output expansion of 31.1% when inputs are fixed
at their given level.
We also observe that the numbers of efficient DMUs are not the same for our
three specifications of the directional vectors. This may seem surprising at first sight,
since our three efficiency measures are based on the same (shadow) profit efficiency
criterion. The different results in Table 3 pertain to the different directional vectors
underlying P̂E
C,E
, P̂E
C,I
and P̂E
C,O
. In particular, it is well-known in the DEA
literature that different directions of efficiency measurement can yield alternative
20It can be verified that, for a given DMU, the value of P̂E
C,E
can never exceed the values of
P̂E
C,O
and P̂E
C,I
, by the very construction of these measures. This definitional property also
appears from the results in Table 3.
26
(in)efficiency classifications. For example, it is well possible that a DMU may not
be able to increase its outputs without affecting its inputs (i.e. efficient in terms of
P̂E
C,O
), while it can decrease its inputs for the given outputs (i.e. inefficient in terms
of P̂E
C,I
). See, for instance, Zhou, Ang and Wang (2012) and Hampf and Kruger
(2015) for related discussions.21
The profit efficiency scores reported in Table 3 do not impose any restriction on
possible shadow prices. As indicated above, this implies that the profit efficiency
results are based on (shadow) prices that may be very far from the prices really
faced by the DMUs. We anticipate this concern in our second efficiency measurement
exercise, which uses price restrictions provided by the management of the service
company under evaluation.
As an introductory note to our results for this second exercise, we remark that
it may actually be that no DMU is found to be profit efficient at the aggregate
level. As discussed in Section 4 (at the end of the paragraph “Shadow prices”),
the overall profit inefficiency measure P̂E
C
can be seen as the aggregate of output-
specific profit inefficiency measures P̂E
C,m
. From this perspective, aggregate profit
efficiency (i.e. P̂E
C
=0) requires profit efficiency for each individual output m (i.e.
P̂E
C,m
= 0 for all m), with the output-specific efficiencies evaluated for output-
specific production possibility sets. Thus, if no individual DMU is profit efficient for
all outputs simultaneously, then we effectively obtain that no DMU is overall profit
efficient. This will turn out to be the case for our profit efficiency analysis with price
restrictions.22
21This also relates to the so-called “slack problem” that received considerable attention in the
DEA literature. In terms of the shadow price representation of DEA measures which we adhere to
here, this slack problem corresponds (dually) to the possibility of zero shadow prices, which prevails
in the case without price restrictions (as for the efficiency results in Table 3).
22As a related remark, if no price restrictions (except from non-negativity) are imposed (as in
our first exercise, with results in Table 3), it can well be that the aggregate efficiency score is fully
determined by a single output. In this case, all other outputs get an implicit weight of zero in the
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Table 4 provides a first summary of our profit efficiency results computed un-
der price restrictions. We consider the same three directional vectors as before. By
construction, the inefficiency scores in this table reveal greater (shadow) profit ineffi-
ciency than the ones in Table 3, because we limit the feasible ranges of shadow prices.
But, in general, the efficiency patterns we observe are roughly similar to the ones in
Table 3. However, one notable and important difference is that we no longer have
any DMU that is labeled efficient at the aggregate level. As explained above, this in-
dicates that there are no DMUs that simultaneously produce all 7 outputs efficiently
when restricting the possible shadow prices.
P̂E
C,E
P̂E
C,I
P̂E
C,O
Min 0 0 0
Mean 0.175 0.322 0.460
Median 0.167 0.322 0.452
Max 0.647 1 1
St. dev. 0.136 0.195 0.362
#Efficient 0 0 0
%Efficient 0 0 0
Table 4: Multi-output profit efficiencies with price restrictions
Output-specific multi-output profit efficiency. As indicated in Section 4, we
can allocate a DMU’s aggregate profit inefficiency to individual outputs by computing
output-specific profit inefficiencies. We believe this provides useful management input
as it helps to better identify specific output production processes where substantial
profit efficiency gains are possible. By using this information, DMU managers can
direct their performance improvement actions in a more effective way.
calculation of the overall profit efficiency. By implication, if there are no price restrictions, we always
have at least one DMU that is profit efficient at the aggregate level (as there is at least one DMU
that is profit efficient for each single output). We can exclude that a single output fully defines a
DMU’s aggregate efficiency score by imposing restrictions that exclude zero shadow prices (as in our
second exercise, with results in Table 4).
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We will illustrate this practice for the (aggregate) profit inefficiency measure
P̂E
C,E
with price restrictions (see also Table 4). Table 5 summarizes our results.23 In
that table, each P̂E
C,m
gives the profit inefficiency specific to output m (m = 1, ..., 7).
These measures have the same interpretation as the aggregate measure P̂E
C,E
, but
now the equiproportionate input reduction and output expansion specifically applies
to the m-th output production process.
Table 5 reveals substantial heterogeneity across the 7 outputs.24 For example, we
find that the production processes of outputs 1 and 2 appear to be most efficient,
in terms of both the average inefficiency (only 16.7% and 9.6%) and the number
of efficient DMUs (28.28% and 31.03%). By contrast, the offices are, on average,
less efficient in the production of outputs 3, 4, 6 and 7 and the biggest number of
inefficient DMUs is found for output 5. It is useful to relate these observations to the
production shares of the 7 outputs that are given in Table 6. Interestingly, output
1 has by far the greatest average share, whereas the production share of output 2 is
virtually zero.
P̂E
C,E
P̂E
C,1
P̂E
C,2
P̂E
C,3
P̂E
C,4
P̂E
C,5
P̂E
C,6
P̂E
C,7
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 0.175 0.126 0.953 0.615 0.543 0.392 0.514 0.442
Median 0.167 0.096 1 0.689 0.638 0.390 0.622 0.489
Max 0.647 0.792 1 1 1 0.929 0.990 0.995
St. dev. 0.136 0.131 0.191 0.337 0.270 0.282 0.266 0.249
#Efficient 0 82 7 27 23 45 27 28
%Efficient 0 28.28 30.43 9.31 7.93 15.52 9.31 9.66
Table 5: Output-specific profit efficiencies
Apart from revealing interesting efficiency patterns at the level of the full sample
23The results for the measures P̂E
C,I
and P̂E
C,O
are reported in Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix.
The interpretation of these tables is directly analogous to the one of Table 5.
24To compute the percentages of efficient DMUs that are reported in Table 5, we only take into
account DMUs that produce non-zero output quantities, i.e. all 290 DMUs for all the outputs except
from output 2 (22 DMUs) and output 3 (285 DMUs).
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Share of the
total production
(%)
Output 1 90.78
Output 2 0
Output 3 6.84
Output 4 0.32
Output 5 0.04
Output 6 0.91
Output 7 1.09
Total 100
Table 6: Share of the total production per output (sample average)
of DMUs (see Table 5), our output-efficiency scores also provide useful information for
individual DMUs. We illustrate this by means of Table 7, which shows the inefficiency
results for two selected DMUs. In parenthesis, we also report the weights of the
output-specific profit efficiency scores to the aggregate profit efficiency score. These
weights sum to one by construction.
DMU 40 is close to efficient in terms of our aggregate efficiency score, whereas
DMU 161 exhibits considerable inefficiency in terms of its aggregate score. The
output-specific efficiency scores give a more balanced picture of the efficiency perfor-
mance of these two DMUs. For example, we find that the high efficiency of DMU 40
is particularly due to its efficient production of the outputs 1, 5 and 7. However, there
is substantial potential to realize efficiency gains in the production of the outputs 2,
4 and 6 (and also, but to a far lesser extent, in the production of output 3). As for
DMU 161, we find that the high level of aggregate inefficiency is caused by inefficient
production of all the outputs. But, again, we observe substantial heterogeneity across
outputs (with output-specific inefficiencies ranging from 29.3% to 100%).
We believe these two examples clearly show the usefulness of our output-specific
efficiency measures to direct the attention of DMU managers towards individual out-
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P̂E
C
P̂E
C,1
P̂E
C,2
P̂E
C,3
P̂E
C,4
P̂E
C,5
P̂E
C,6
P̂E
C,7
DMU 40 0.00367 0 1 0.345 0.601 0 0.581 0
(0.132) (0.00172) (0.00256) (0.000429) (0.534) (0.00138) (0.328)
DMU 161 0.386 0.312 1 0.505 0.750 0.293 0.694 0.622
(0.808) (0.0517) (0.0699) (0.0113) (0.00361) (0.0369) (0.0186)
Table 7: Output-specific profit efficiencies for selected DMUs
puts that are characterized by profit inefficiency. Importantly, this holds not only for
DMUs with low efficiency (like DMU 161) but also for DMUs of which the aggregate
performance is close to efficient (like DMU 40).
6 Conclusion
We presented a novel DEA toolkit for profit efficiency analysis in the context of multi-
output production. A distinguishing feature of our methodology is that it assumes
output-specific production technologies. In addition, the methodology accounts for
the use of joint inputs, and explicitly includes information on the allocation of inputs
to specific outputs.
We have specified a multi-output profit inefficiency measure when prices are ob-
served, as well as a shadow profit inefficiency measure that can be used if prices are
unknown. Our framework also allows us to define output-specific profit inefficiency
measures, which allocate a DMU’s aggregate profit inefficiency to individual outputs.
Finally, we established a dual relationship between our multi-output profit inefficiency
measure and a technical inefficiency measure that takes the form of a multi-output
directional distance function.
We illustrated our methodology by an empirical application to a large European
service company. This demonstrated the practical usefulness of our measure for
(shadow) profit inefficiency at the aggregate DMU level. Next, we showed that our
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output-specific profit inefficiency measures provide useful management input. They
can identify individual outputs that are characterized by substantial inefficiency, so
that performance improvement actions can be directed primarily towards these out-
puts.
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Appendix
P̂E
C
P̂E
C,1
P̂E
C,2
P̂E
C,3
P̂E
C,4
P̂E
C,5
P̂E
C,6
P̂E
C,7
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 0.322 0.215 0.960 0.710 0.663 0.526 0.639 0.587
Median 0.322 0.193 1 0.826 0.784 0.610 0.777 0.675
Max 1 0.868 1 1 1 1 1 1
#Efficient 0 77 7 28 24 41 25 27
%Efficient 0 26.55 40.90 9.66 8.28 14.14 8.62 9.31
Table 8: Output-specific profit inefficiencies for the input reduction direction
P̂E
C
P̂E
C,1
P̂E
C,2
P̂E
C,3
P̂E
C,4
P̂E
C,5
P̂E
C,6
P̂E
C,7
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 0.460 0.363 0.961 0.830 0.837 0.709 0.840 0.799
Median 0.452 0.263 1 1 1 1. 1 1
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
#Efficient 0 71 7 29 23 33 24 24
%Efficient 0 24.48 40.90 10.00 7.93 11.38 8.28 8.28
Table 9: Output-specific profit inefficiencies for the output expansion direction
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